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By th e Sprin g of 1920, th e politica l futur e of Bolshevism looke d assured despit e th e 
AUied Interventio n in th e Russian civil war. Although th e victoriou s allies in th e west 
had committe d men and treasur e to th e cause of th e White forces, in th e end thei r 
investmen t in th e counterrevolutio n yielded only substantia l politica l losses. With th e 
demise of Admirá l Aleksandr Kolchak' s White struggle in Siberia in Januar y 1920, th e 
Bolshevik triump h over thei r Russian opponent s was complete . Onl y on e major task 
remaine d for th e Bolsheviks: confrontin g th e Polish armie s in Ukraine . 
In latě April 1920, th e Polish leader Józef Pilsudsk i launche d a militar y Operatio n 
with th e politica l aim of detachin g Ukrain e from Russia and includin g it in an ill-de -
fined East Europea n federation '. O n 7 May , Polish forces occupie d Kiev and Pilsudsk i 
seemed on th e verge of realizin g his aims. Th e fortune s of th e Kiev offensive, however , 
quickly rebounded . Th e Bolsheviks, freed from thei r White opponents , launche d a 
counterattac k against th e Pole s in early June . By th e end of th e month , th e Bolsheviks 
had regaine d th e initiative , expelled th e Pole s from Ukrain e and began thei r marc h on 
Warsaw. 
Th e resultin g crisis threatene d no t onl y th e survival of Polan d but also th e Versailles 
peace settlement . If Warsaw feil th e road to Berlin lay open . Moreover , th e crisis 
brough t int o th e ope n th e questio n of th e role of th e successor states in Easter n Europ e 
- particularl y Czechoslovakia , Poland , an d Romani a -  vis-á-vis  allied polic y towar d 
th e problé m of Bolshevism. Were th e successor states an integra l par t of allied stratégy 
to eradicat e (or at least contain ) Bolshevism? Thi s question , while certainl y pertinen t 
in 1919-1920 to allied polic y makers , has since occupie d th e attentio n of historians . 
Arnold J. Mayer , on e of th e mos t provocativ e and stimulatin g interpreter s of th e 
post-Worl d War On e peace settlemen t and allied policy towar d Bolshevism, has di-
rectl y addresse d thi s question . In his Politics and Diplomacy ofPeacemaking: Contain-
ment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919  he argued tha t "the Pari s Peac e 
Conferenc e mad e a hos t of decisions , all of which , in varying degrees, were designed 
to chec k Bolshevism" 2. H e went on to write tha t "the victors mad e territoria l conces -
sions to Poland , Romania , and Czechoslovaki a for helpin g to stem th e revolutionar y 
1 See: D z i e w a n o w s k i , M. K : Józef Pilsudski: A Europea n Federalist , 1918-1922. Stan-
ford 1969. 
2 Mayer , Arnold J.: Politic s and Diplomac y of Peacemaking : Containmen t and Counter -
revolution at Versailles, 1918-1919. Londo n 1967, 9. 
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tide beyon d thei r own borders ; the y gave militar y assistance and economi c aid to these 
and othe r borde r land s as well as to th e White s for thei r arme d assault on Soviet Russia" 3. 
While Mayer' s thesis has attracte d criticism from othe r historian s of th e Peac e Con -
ference 4, it is worthwhil e to conside r ho w valid Mayer' s thesis is a year after th e sig-
nin g of th e Treat y of Versailles. 
R. A. Leeper , in a documen t date d on e year to th e day after th e signing of th e Treat y 
of Versailles and drafted durin g th e loomin g crisis in the Polish-Sovie t war (see below), 
provide s some interestin g insight s int o th e validity of th e Maye r thesis in th e contex t 
of British foreign policy. 
Reginal d Wildig Allen "Rex" Leepe r enjoyed a distinguishe d caree r in th e British 
diplomati c Service. H e was bor n on 25 Marc h 1888 in Sydney, Ne w Sout h Wales and 
his educatio n brough t him from th e antipode s to Englan d where he graduate d from 
Ne w College , Oxford . Hi s caree r in th e British civil Service began in th e Intelligenc e 
Bureau , Departmen t of Informatio n in 1917. A year later he joined th e Foreig n Office 
as a temporar y clerk when th e Intelligenc e Burea u becam e th e Politica l Intelligenc e 
Departmen t (PID ) of the Foreig n Office5. 
In Januar y 1920 his temporar y post in th e Foreig n Office becam e permanen t when 
he obtaine d an appointmen t as a secon d secretar y in th e diplomati c service. Leeper' s 
subsequen t assignment s too k him to Warsaw, Riga, Istanbul , Durazzo , and back to 
th e Foreig n Office in London . Th e outbrea k of th e Secon d World War first engaged 
him in propagand a work at Wobur n (where , n o doubt , his earlier associatio n with th e 
Intelligenc e Burea u served him well). Between 1943 and 1946 he was Ambassado r to 
Greec e and the n Ambassado r to Argentin a unti l his retiremen t in 19486. 
Leepe r was n o strange r to Easter n Europe . H e served as Charge ďAffaires in War-
saw between 1923 and 1924 and again from 1927 to 1929. In August 1923 he earne d a 
special allowanc e for his knowledge of Polish 7. Hi s mor e tha n casual interes t in th e 
affairs of Easter n Europ e stemme d from his wartim e work in th e Intelligenc e Burea u 
and later in th e PID , which undoubtedl y brough t him int o contac t with th e man y East 
Europea n politician s residin g in Londo n durin g th e Grea t War. 
Soon after receiving his permanen t appointmen t to th e Foreig n Office, he too k a 
month' s leave and in Ma y 1920 travelled to Czechoslovaki a and Poland . With th e 
Bolshevik armie s marchin g on Warsaw and bot h Polan d and th e Versailles peace sett-
lemen t totterin g on th e edge of destruction , Leeper' s séjour to these countrie s coul d 
no t have com e at a mor e auspiciou s moment . While in Pragu e he me t Masary k and 
later met Pilsudsk i in Warsaw. 
Upo n returnin g to London , Leepe r submitte d to th e Foreig n Office a pape r on "The 
Russian Questio n Seen from Polan d and Czecho-Slovakia " date d 28 Jun e 19208. Th e 
3 Ibid . 
4 Inparticularsee : L u n d g r e e n - N i e l s e n , Kay:ThePolishProblemattheParisPeaceCon -
ference : A Study of the Policie s of the Grea t Powers and the Poles,1918-1919 . Odense 1979. 
5 Who Was Who 1901-1970. Vol. 6. Londo n 1972, 663. 
6 The Foreign Office List 1949, 281. 
7 Ibid . 
8 R. A. Leeper , "The Russian Questio n Seen from Polan d and Czecho-Slovakia" , 28 Jun e 1920 
can be found in the Politica l Intelligenc e Departmen t files of the Foreign Office, F O 371/ 
4375-906, at the Public Recor d Office, Kew, London . 
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d o c u m e n t is mor e tha n a summar y of hi s conversation s wi th Masary k an d Pilsudski . 
I n it h e outline s th e reason s behin d th e fundamental l y differen t at t i tude s of th e Pole s 
an d Czechoslovak s towar d Bolshevik Russia . H i s paper ' s relevanc e t o Britis h pol ic y 
towar d th e p rob lé m of Bolshevism was patent l y obvious . 
Leeper ' s pape r at tracte d th e interes t of impor tan t reader s in th e Foreig n Office. 
L o r d C u r z o n , th e Fore ig n Secretary , an d L o r d Ha rd inge , a Pe rmanen t Undersecre -
tary , b o t h rea d th e documen t an d t o o k th e t roubl e of appendin g minute s ( include d 
below) . As th e attache d minute s indicate , Leeper ' s pape r raised som e uncomfor tabl e 
quest ion s regardin g th e efficacy of Britis h pol ic y t o w a r d Eas ter n E u r o p e an d th e p r o b -
lém of Bolshevism . Leeper ' s pape r ha s th e sam e effect concernin g con tempora r y 
historica l debate s regardin g allied pol ic y towar d Bolshevism . 
T H E RUSSIA N QUESTIO N SEE N FRO M POLAN D A N D CZECHO-SLOVAKI A 
Mos t of th e leadin g countrie s in Europ e have in populä r opinio n com e to be associate d with a 
certai n polic y with regard to BolshevikRussia . France , for example , is considere d to be definitel y 
unwillin g to negotiat e with th e Bolsheviks, Ital y has pledged herself to peace , while Britain 
Stand s half-way . Indeed , if on e travelled throug h Europ e at th e presen t momen t on e coul d 
probabl y collec t a differen t poin t of view abou t Russia from each country , some countrie s being 
anxiou s for füll peace and norma l intercourse , other s being sceptica l abou t th e possibilities of a 
füll peace and uncertai n whethe r it is even wort h attempting . 
Ther e are two Slav countries , Polan d and Czecho-Slovakia , which are particularl y intereste d 
in th e presen t and futur e of Russia, and th e public opinio n of th e two is strongly opposed . 
Polan d is definitel y anti-Bolshevik , mor e so at th e momen t probabl y tha n any othe r country , 
and to a certai n exten t anti-Russia n in generál , while Czecho-Slovaki a is extremel y pro-Russia n 
and incline d to conclud e peace with th e Bolsheviks. 
These difference s are due to a variety of causes: 
1) Th e Czech s have nevěr suffered from Russian aggression and have in th e past always looked 
to Russia against Germany . Thu s a stron g pro-Russia n traditio n has arisen . With th e Pole s th e 
case is entirel y different . Th e onl y Russia the y have know n has been Tsarist Russia or Bolshevik 
Russia, bot h of which have followed th e same policy toward s them . The y mistrus t th e Russian s 
politicall y and feel, whethe r rightly or wrongly, tha t th e Russian temperamen t is fundamentall y 
oppose d to thei r own . As th e well-know n Polish writer Zdziechowsk i has expressed it in a boo k 
recentl y publishe d in Cracow : "The fundamenta l tendenc y of th e Russian is Maximalis m - all or 
nothing . In th e Russian on e finds th e anarchica l tendenc y of th e Slav mixed with th e blind Sub-
mission of th e Mongo l to superio r force". 
2) Th e Czech s view th e questio n of Bolshevism mor e from an economi c tha n a politica l poin t 
of view, wherea s in Polan d th e politica l questio n assumes muc h greater prominenc e tha n th e eco-
nomic . Th e imperialisti c characte r of Bolshevism does no t alarm th e Czechs , wherea s it is thi s 
aspect of Bolshevism which is always presen t to th e Poles . Thu s th e Czech s are willing to discuss 
Bolshevism in muc h th e same detache d way as th e questio n is discussed in England , wherea s to 
the Pole s a pro-Bolshevi k or a semi-Bolshevi k is anathema . Tha t does no t mea n tha t th e Pole s are 
reactionary . If Bolshevism ruled in Madri d and no t in Mosco w th e Pole s migh t be read y to com e 
to term s with it in th e same way as th e Czech s are now, but Bolshevism in Mosco w controlle d 
by Jews and Russian s is a very different thin g to th e Pole s from a similar movemen t elsewhere . 
I t is impossible for anybod y who has been in Polan d to overloo k this aspect of Bolshevism or to 
děn y tha t th e Pole s have good reason for thei r fears and suspicions . 
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The Poles and Czechs, looking at the question of Russia and Bolshevism from such totally 
different points of view, have naturally come to different conclusions with regard to the question 
of present policy. It would be difficult to find anything more striking than the change of atmo-
sphere on the Russian question in passing from Poland to Czecho-Slovakia. It is best therefore 
to consider these points of view separately and in greater detail. 
a) The Polish View. 
Ever since the Armistice when the Polish State came into being Poland has been at war with 
Bolshevik Russia. In špite of the fact that Poland was taken at a disadvantage without any pre-
liminary organisastion the Poles have so far been remarkably successful. They have pushed the 
Red Army back from the neighbourhood of Brest Litovsk to the Beresina some 50 miles east of 
Minsk on the Northern front, while on the Southern front they still hold the líne of the Teterev 
some hundreds of miles east of Congress Poland. Kiev has been lost and the policy of setting up 
an independent Ukraine has had a serious set-back, but from a purely military point of view the 
Situation is not considered to be dangerous. The Polish military reverses in the south have 
been due to the superior numbers of the Bolshevik cavalry which succeeded in breaking through 
a looseely held front. The Polish infantry, however, has consistently shown itself superior to the 
Bolshevik infantry and the moral of the Polish troops is still very much higher than that of their 
opponents. 
The war in the East, however, is not a purely military matter. Success does not depend so 
much on military as on moral and psychological factors. The Poles are a highly-strung and emo-
tional people, very good, indeed brilliant, when things are going well and when they are playing 
before a sympathetic gallery, but easily and quickly dispirited when they meet with indifference 
or hostility from those whose friendship and assistance they value. At the present moment 
Poland appears to be passing through the latter phase and signs of real uneasiness are appearing. 
The atmosphere is not altogether healthy and the uneasiness is caused more than anything eise 
by the attitude of Great Britain. In England one finds opinion extraordinarily divided on the 
question of Bolshevism and the more one reads the English press the more complete becomes 
one's confusion; in Poland itself the issues are much clearer and Bolshevism is shorn of the 
enchantment that its distance from England has lent it. To the Poles it is a matter of genuine aston-
ishment and dismay that England should show, if not Bolshevik sympathies, a readiness to 
enter into direct relations with the Bolshevik Government. The Pole, while admitting that he is 
struggling first and foremost for his own existence, also feels sincerely that he is the bulwark of 
Western civilisation against Eastern savagery. We may not regard the Pole as altogether Western, 
fóre he is far more Slav than Western, but fundamentally he is right in his contention that he is 
fighting for the same principles that Western Europe fought for during the war and that it is just 
as difficult for him to come to terms with Bolshevik Russia as it was for us to come to terms with 
Germany before the latter was beaten. 
While admitting this side of the Polish argument there is another aspect of the Polish-Russian 
question which is more disquieting and which it is impossible for Western Europe to sympathise 
with. So long as the Poles are fighting Bolshevism and not Russia there will always be a large 
measure of sympathy for them in England and elsewhere in Western Europe, but once the Poles 
go further and prepare to convert the present war into a war against Russia it is inevitable that all 
support of their cause in Western Europe should disappear, not so much perhaps because of pro-
Russian sympathies here as because of the wider political issues involved. Unfortunately in the 
course of a three weeks' visit to Poland - including Warsaw, Minsk, Lemberg and Cracow - I 
have seen a good many traces of the latter tendency. Many Poles with whom I talked appeared 
to me to make little effort to conceal the fact that in their opinion the Russians were just as much 
their enemies as the Bolsheviks and that they themselves were fighting Russia just as keenly as 
they were fighting Bolshevism. At Minsk especially I noticed this tendency. Minsk is a purely 
Russian and Jewish town, but during the Polish occupation it has been almost entirely polonised 
superficially. N o Russian sign-boards are allowed over the shops and the Russian names of the 
streets have been removed in the same way as at Warsaw. In conversation with Poles I noticed 
that I was being given more anti-Russian propaganda than anti-Bolshevik and that the tendency 
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was to impres s me mor e with th e wickednes s of th e Russian in generá l tha n with tha t of th e Bol-
shevik in particular . 
Thi s tendenc y is by n o mean s universa l in Poland . I t is no t shared for example by Pilsudsk i or 
by othe r farseeing Poles , bu t it certainl y exists and is, so far as I could judge, especially notice -
able amongs t a good man y Polish officers. I t can onl y cause Polan d har m unless it is checke d for 
two obvious reasons : -  1) I t will help th e Bolsheviks to rally Russian nationa l suppor t against th e 
Poles , 2) I t will alienat e all sympath y in Western Europe . 
O n returnin g from Mins k I had an intervie w with Pilsudsk i with whom I discussed these very 
point s as well as th e wider aspect s of th e struggle against Bolshevism. I told him m y impression s 
and venture d to express my persona l view tha t in a struggle against Russia as apar t from Bolshe-
vism Polan d coul d nevěr hop e to obtai n British suppor t or sympathy . Pilsudsk i warmly denie d 
tha t he was fighting Russia and maintaine d tha t Polish polic y was no t directe d against Russia. H e 
fully appreciate d th e dange r of Russian nationa l suppor t being given to th e Bolsheviks and was 
doin g his best to preven t it. H e said he would willingly co-operat e with anti-Boshevi k Russian 
forces if he coul d find any such forces on who m he coul d rely. H e had always felt convince d tha t 
Denikin' s administratio n would break down and was no t yet convince d tha t Wrangel would faře 
muc h better , thoug h he had notice d certai n good signs in tha t direction . H e was no t prepared , 
however , to co-operat e with him at th e moment . If he coul d find othe r Russian s with whom it 
was possible t o co-operate , he would no t necessaril y refuse. 
With regard to th e questio n of peace with th e Bolsheviks he urged tha t th e Polish difficulties 
were no t rightly appreciate d in England . I t was absurd to accuse him of fighting Socialism . Social-
ism he understoo d and coul d sympathis e with , but Bolshevism was mer e savagery. I t was no t 
easy to com e to term s with savagery. Moreover , onc e he had com e to term s he had n o guarante e 
tha t th e term s would be observed by th e Bolsheviks. As far as Polan d was concerne d th e Bolshe-
viks had a sufficient guarantee , as Polan d had a Parliamen t electe d by universa l suffrage, but 
Polan d had no guarante e from th e vote of a self-constitute d bod y such as tha t of th e Soviets 
which did no t represen t and was no t elected by th e Russian people . 
But apar t from this ther e were othe r difficulties. H e did no t believe tha t th e Bolsheviks sincere -
ly desired peac e with Poland , thoug h he recognise d tha t ther e were certai n element s amongs t 
the m who did want peace . O n th e whole , however , he did no t believe tha t th e Bolsheviks were 
sincere . H e agreed tha t on e of th e reason s why th e Bolsheviks feared peac e with Polan d and 
would obstruc t it when it cam e to the poin t was tha t the y did no t want to demobilis e thei r army . 
If the y were to keep an arm y in being th e best excuse was tha t the y had to use it against Polan d 
on th e groun d tha t Polan d was imperialist . Peac e with the Baltic State s and Western Europ e was 
a very different matter . Ther e th e Bolsheviks were really striving to secure peace as the y were 
desperatel y anxiou s to secure supplies. 
Pilsudsk i repeatedl y expressed his desire tha t Englan d shoul d understan d th e Polish poin t of 
view better . I t is clear tha t he , like nearl y every othe r Pole , pays infinitel y mor e attentio n to Brit-
ish tha n to Frenc h opinion . Pilsudski' s generá l attitud e was, so far as I coul d gather , tha t in deal-
ing with th e Bolsheviks force and determinatio n were th e decisive factors , tha t these were th e 
onl y weapon s the y understoo d and appreciate d and tha t he still considere d his Ukrainia n experi-
men t had been wort h while. H e coul d not , however , continu e indefinitel y if British sympath y 
were withhel d from him and he viewed with th e greatest alarm th e negotiation s takin g place at 
presen t with Krassin . Thoug h his persona l opinio n was tha t nothin g muc h coul d com e from 
the m the y were meanwhil e giving the impressio n in Polan d tha t British help was being given to 
th e Bolsheviks rathe r tha n to th e Poles . H e was anxiou s to kno w th e real intention s of th e British 
Governmen t in thi s matte r and ho w lon g it would take British public opinio n to be disillusione d 
abou t Russian Bolshevism. If th e British Governmen t would break off negotiation s with th e 
Bolsheviks and tur n thei r attentio n to Polan d th e Situatio n would at onc e becom e muc h easier. 
In tha t case co-operatio n with anti-Bolshevi k Russia would no t be impossible provide d Grea t 
Britain pointe d th e way. 
b) The Czech View. 
When I was in Pragu e on Jun e 23 I spoke with Presiden t Masary k abou t th e same question . As 
I had often discussed Russian question s with him before when he was living in Londo n we were 
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on familiär ground . I began by explainin g to him th e Polish poin t of view in generá l and tha t of 
Pilsudsk i in particular . Masary k mad e no secret of th e fact tha t he did no t trus t th e Poles , thoug h 
he admitte d tha t the stability of th e new Polish Stat e was of vital importance . H e considere d tha t 
in his Ukrainia n polic y Pilsudsk i had gambled and tha t th e world was nevěr sympatheti c toward s 
an unsuccessfu l gambler . Hi s impressio n was tha t Polan d was in a very bad way and had as yet 
mad e no attemp t to settle her interna l questions . In man y ways he though t tha t Polan d was faced 
with th e same interna l problem s which had brough t Bolshevism in Russia and he felt very uncer -
tain abou t her future . 
With regard to Russia he said he still felt uncertai n as to th e real forces in th e country . H e was 
in sympath y with the Russian s generally and was on thei r side, but he had no belief in the m and 
did no t thin k tha t any Russian forces would succeed in organisin g an effective force against th e 
Bolsheviks. H e had himsel f often before believed in the speedy disappearanc e of the Bolsheviks, 
but apparentl y the y had grown stronge r rathe r tha n weaker. H e was no t prepare d therefor e to 
gamble on th e defeat of the Bolsheviks by militar y means . H e preferre d to follow a polic y of 
peace and commercia l intercourse , hopin g tha t th e presenc e of Englishme n especially would 
make an impressio n on th e Russian s and help to mak e the m understan d th e Situatio n better . H e 
hope d tha t thi s would no t strengthe n th e Bolsheviks, but admitte d tha t thi s polic y also was in th e 
natur e of a gamble, thoug h no t so dangerou s a gamble as the militar y gamble advocate d by Pil-
sudski. 
In talkin g abou t Russia th e Presiden t laid emphasi s on th e fact tha t it was onl y on e par t of 
generá l Europea n polic y and tha t th e on e thin g neede d was a stron g lead on the par t of Grea t Brit-
ain . British polic y shoul d lead Europ e and , if necessary , dictat e to Europe . Th e latte r would readily 
follow any lead; indee d in his opinio n half th e troubl e no w existing in Europ e was due to th e 
absenc e of a stron g lead on th e par t of the British Government . Th e latte r shoul d have a stron g 
Germa n polic y and a stron g Russian policy, but half measure s in eithe r case would be fatal. Espe-
cially in th e case of Russia an y polic y toward s th e Bolsheviks mus t be firm and consistent . A 
peace policy toward s th e Bolsheviks mus t be followed just as firmly as a war policy . What caused 
him anxiet y was th e uncertaint y which he detecte d in British polic y at a momen t when it coul d 
and should lead Europe . 
O n the basis of th e above interviews with Marsha l Pilsudsk i and Presiden t Masary k and man y 
othe r conversation s in Polan d I ventur e to suggest tha t th e Czec h and Polish point s of view can 
onl y be reconcile d by direc t actio n on th e par t of th e British Government . Czecho-Slovaki a is 
prepare d to follow any lead given by the British Governmen t on th e questio n of Russian policy. 
Poland , on th e othe r hand , being mor e directl y concerned , will thin k first of her own securit y 
and will, if necessary , pursu e an independen t course . At the same tim e unde r certai n condition s 
I believe she would be quit e amenabl e t o a lead from us on th e generá l questio n of he r presen t and 
futur e relation s with Russia. Muc h however depend s on the way she is handled . I t is no t enoug h 
to adop t a purel y correc t attitude , leaving Polan d to settle her quarre l with th e Bolsheviks and at 
th e same tim e comin g to ou r own arrangement s with th e Soviet Government . So far thi s polic y 
has been misunderstoo d in Poland , where it is regarde d as directl y hostil e t o he r and due to 
Jewish influenc e in British politics . Howeve r unreasonabl e thi s ma y appea r to us it is a fact to be 
reckone d with and is tendin g to weaken a countr y which , whatever ma y be said against it, 
remain s th e onl y effective barrie r between Bolshevism and Western civilisation . Th e downfal l of 
Polan d would be a disaster to Europ e and would probabl y destro y th e whole peac e settlemen t 
which we are attemptin g to brin g about . 
To remed y thi s Situatio n and to exert ou r füll influenc e in Polan d a chang e in ou r generá l attitud e 
would be necessary . In th e first place Polan d expect s us to choos e definitel y between her and 
Bolshevik Russia . While she is engaged in a life and deat h struggle with Bolshevism she does no t 
understan d th e attitud e of any ally who negotiate s separatel y with her mos t dangerou s enemy . 
If, however , we broke off relation s with the Soviet Governmen t and mad e it clear tha t we under -
stoo d Polanď s very real difficulties in her relation s with Russia , we shoul d at onc e win a positio n 
of enormou s influenc e in Polan d and could moul d her generá l polic y toward s Russia alon g th e 
lineš which we though t best. Provide d we gave her ou r mora l suppor t and tha t measur e of patienc e 
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and understandin g which is so necessar y in dealin g with a Slav peopl e we coul d almos t certainl y 
correc t man y of th e mistake s which th e Pole s are no w makin g in thei r attitud e toward s Russia 
and th e Russians . If we encourage d her to co-operat e with Russian s against th e Bolsheviks and 
to mak e it unmistakabl y clear tha t the war was no t against Russia, she would willingly follow ou r 
lead an d in so doin g she coul d rapidl y destro y th e bad feeling which has been steadily growing 
amongs t all classes of Russian s and could take th e sting ou t of the Bolshevik offensive. Polish 
problem s are alread y so inextricabl y mixed with Russian tha t th e only way to avoid futur e diffi-
cultie s is to approac h th e Russian questio n throug h Polan d and link her up as a willing partne r in 
ou r Solutio n rathe r tha n approac h Bolshevik Russia directl y while leaving Polan d to make th e 
best of an almos t intolerabl e Situation . Th e difficulties of th e Russo-Polis h question s are very 
real, but th e dange r in ignorin g Polan d and leaving her to her f ate is so great tha t it ma y be consid -
ered bette r to undertak e ou r responsibilitie s no w rathe r tha n allow th e presen t sores to fester 
and destro y all possibility of an understandin g in th e future . 
(28.6.20) . R. A. Leepe r [handwritten ] 
Minutes 
Mr . Leepe r has just returne d from a month' s leave which he has spen t in Polan d and Bohemia . 
Hi s conclusion s are containe d in th e annexe d pape r and are well wort h consideration . 
I share his view tha t we shoul d deal with Russia in Cooperatio n with th e surroundin g coun -
tries. [V. L. ?] 28/ 6 
Th e Solutio n propose d by Mr . Leepe r would entai l a complet e reversal of th e polic y no w being 
pursue d of endeavourin g to make term s with th e Bolsheviks while having th e Pole s to stew in 
thei r own juice and to endur e th e result s of thei r own foliy in undertakin g an offensive against 
th e Soviet Govt . in Oppositio n to th e advice given to Mr . Pate k here . 
I do no t propos e to criticise th e policy so far adopted , as it would be a waste of time , but it is 
quit e obvious tha t th e Allied Power s canno t allow th e Pole s to stew in thei r own juice if th e Bol-
sheviks shoul d reject them , invade Polan d 8c captur e Warsaw. Thi s would be th e destructio n of 
th e treat y of Versailles, and would necessaril y modif y th e attitud e of th e Allies towar d German y 
who would the n be exposed to th e füll blast of Bolshevik propagand a on her frontiers . Ther e is 
nothin g immediat e to be don ě unless it be possible to exercise restrain t upo n th e Bolsheviks 
throug h Krassin & to compel l th e Pole s to mak e peace , but it is as well even no w no t to lose sight 
of possible complication s on Germany' s eastern frontie r in th e event of th e continuatio n of 
Russo-Polis h militar y Operations . H . [Hardinge , no date ] 
I too k Mr . Leeper' s paper - with me to Spa. And events have moved so quickly tha t it was al-
mos t immediatel y ou t of dat e and no polic y remaine d but tha t which we and th e allies decide d to 
attemp t -  with what degree of success tha t remain s to be seen. C . [Curzon ] 16/7/2 0 
